Inside Toyota, Executives Trade Blame Over Debacle
丰田管理层派系之争的渊源
Toyota Motor Corp.'s quality crisis is exposing -- and exacerbating -- a long-simmering internal feud. The battle pits the founding Toyoda family against a group of professional managers, each blaming the other for the auto maker's woes.
丰田汽车公司(Toyota Motor Corp.)的质量危机暴露并加剧了由来已久的内部不和。这场较量使丰田创始家族与一批职业管理人员对立起来，双方都指责对方令公司陷入了困境。
Behind the scenes in recent weeks, the skirmishing has grown intense. President Akio Toyoda, the 53-year-old grandson of the founder, has tried to push out one of the nonfamily executives: his predecessor as president, Katsuaki Watanabe, now vice chairman.
近几周来，双方的纷争暗中变得激烈起来。丰田公司创始人53岁的孙子、现任丰田总裁丰田章男(Akio Toyoda)试图将一位非丰田家族成员高管挤出管理层──前任总裁、现在的副董事长渡边捷昭(Katsuaki Watanabe)。
Not long after the company made one of its massive safety recalls in mid-January, Mr. Toyoda suggested to Mr. Watanabe, through an intermediary, that the former president leave the auto giant and instead run a Toyota affiliate, according to an executive who says he was told about the move by Mr. Toyoda.
据一位自称从丰田章男处得知这一情况的高管说，在1月中旬丰田因安全问题进行了大规模召回之后不久，丰田章男通过一位中间人建议渡边捷昭离开丰田，转去运营丰田的一家关联企业。
Mr. Watanabe refused.
渡边捷昭拒绝了丰田章男的建议。
The standoff, which hasn't been reported before, is a dramatic example of how the old split between the two camps is bubbling to the surface amid Toyota's crisis. The feud is a distraction for a divided leadership as officials struggle to regain their footing after three months of attacks unprecedented in the company's 75-year history.
以前从未报导过的僵局凸显出，在丰田遭遇危机之际，两个阵营之间旧有的分歧开始浮出水面。在丰田75年历史上前所未有的危机之后三个月，公司高管们努力重新站稳脚跟，而内部不和则分散了分裂的领导层的精力。
Mr. Toyoda and his allies have been saying openly that when he took the top job last year after a 15-year hiatus for the Toyoda clan, he inherited a company weakened by nonfamily predecessors who sacrificed quality for faster growth and fatter margins.
丰田章男及其盟友一直公开表示，当他去年成为15年来首位丰田家族成员总裁后，他继承的是一家在非家族成员前任总裁们手中变得羸弱的企业，那些总裁牺牲了质量来换取更快的增长和更高的利润率。
The problems arose when 'some people just got too big-headed and focused too excessively on profit,' Mr. Toyoda said at a Beijing news conference in March. He acknowledged the 'ultimate responsibility for mistakes . . . lies in me.'
丰田章男3月份在北京的一次新闻发布会上说，当有些人变得过于自负、过于专注利润的时候，问题就出现了。他承认，失误的最终责任在自己身上。
A week earlier, Jim Press -- once the top Toyota executive in the U.S. before he jumped to a rival auto maker -- issued a statement declaring: 'The root cause of their problems is that the company was hijacked, some years ago, by anti-family, financially oriented pirates.'
在那之前一周，曾担任丰田公司驻美国高管、之后跳槽到一家竞争对手公司的普莱斯(Jim Press)发表了一份声明说，他们的问题根源在于，这家公司几年前被反丰田家族、以财务为导向的海盗劫持了。
Those executives 'didn't have the character to maintain a customer-first focus. Akio does,' said Mr. Press, who had a run-in with nonfamily Japanese bosses several years ago.
普莱斯说，这些高管“没有坚持客户第一的品质”，而丰田章男则具备这种品质。普莱斯几年前与非丰田家族日本高管之间发生过口角。
A Toyota spokeswoman declined to comment on the infighting, saying: 'We do not discuss executive changes unless they are formally decided.' She declined to comment on the statements by Messrs. Toyoda and Press, or to make Mr. Watanabe available for comment.
丰田发言人拒绝就内部不和发表置评。她说，除非高管人事变动正式确定，否则我们不会讨论此事。她拒绝就丰田章男和普莱斯的声明置评，也拒绝安排渡边捷昭发表置评。
Privately, the nonfamily managers have been waging their own campaign within the Toyota group. They say Mr. Toyoda never publicly opposed their profit-growth strategy when the company was widely praised for making big money and surpassing General Motors Corp. to become the world's No. 1 auto maker. They say Toyota's current troubles are less a quality crisis and more a management and public-relations crisis of Mr. Toyoda's making, reflecting their longstanding warnings that he wasn't ready to run a global corporation.
私下里，非丰田家族管理人员一直在丰田集团内部开展自己的宣传活动。他们说，当公司因大幅盈利、超过通用汽车公司(General Motors Corp.)成为全球第一大汽车生产商而获得普遍赞誉的时候，丰田章男从未公开反对过他们利润增长的战略。他们说，丰田公司目前的困境与其说是质量危机，不如说是丰田章男造成的管理和公关危机，折射出他们一直以来认为丰田章男没有准备好运营一家全球企业的警告。
'Is Akio ducking criticism of being a beneficiary of nepotism by accusing us and trying to justify his ascendancy to the top job?' one of Mr. Watanabe's top aides said. 'One of our biggest social responsibilities is to generate profits and pay taxes. To criticize the company's effort to maximize profits and thus taxes is just complete nonsense.'
渡边捷昭的高级助手之一说，丰田章男是否在通过指责我们、试图给他担任总裁一职寻找合理的理由，而逃避外界认为他是裙带关系受益者的批评？我们最大的社会责任之一是盈利和纳税。批评丰田公司最大化利润和纳税的努力，纯粹是无稽之谈。
Hiroshi Okuda, a nonfamily president who ran the company from 1995 through 1999, has told at least two associates since the recalls of cars involved in sudden acceleration incidents earlier this year: 'Akio needs to go.' The 77-year-old remains a key company adviser even though he gave up his board seat last year.
今年早些时候丰田因突然加速问题而召回汽车以来，曾在1995年至1999年担任丰田公司总裁的非丰田家族人士奥田硕(Hiroshi Okuda)对至少两名助手说过，丰田章男必须离开。77岁的奥田硕去年放弃了董事会席位，不过仍是公司主要顾问之一。
Toyota declined to make Mr. Okuda available for comment. The Toyota spokeswoman declined to comment.
丰田拒绝安排奥田硕发表置评。上述丰田发言人拒绝置评。
Takahiro Fujimoto, a professor of economics at Tokyo University who has studied Toyota extensively, says airing problems openly is very much part of Toyota's corporate culture focused on kaizen, or continuous improvement. 'But it's highly unusual for anybody inside Toyota to publicly criticize certain individuals by name,' or to criticize in a way that it's easy for anybody to identify the targets.
东京大学经济学教授、对丰田公司有广泛研究的藤本隆宏(Takahiro Fujimoto)说，将问题公布于众是丰田不断进步的企业文化的一部分。不过，丰田内部人员公开指名道姓地批评某个人，或是批评的方式让人很容易就能确定批评对象身份的做法是非常少见的。
The feud dates to the mid-1990s, when the family relinquished control of the chief executive's office for the first time since Eiji Toyoda, the cousin of the founder, became president in 1967. Non-Toyodas also ran the company from 1950-67.
丰田内部的不和可以追溯到20世纪90年代中期，当时丰田家族自1967年丰田英二(Eiji Toyoda)担任总裁以来首次放弃了对总裁一职的控制。丰田英二是丰田创始人的堂弟。1950年至1967年，公司也是由非丰田家族高管运营的。
By the time Akio's uncle, Tatsuro, stepped down as president in 1995, after a stroke, the company was losing market share and risked posting its first loss since 1950. It was vulnerable to a weak Japanese economy, trade friction with the U.S., and a strong Japanese currency that crimped exports.
到丰田章男的叔父丰田达郎(Tatsuro Toyoda)1995年因中风卸任总裁职位之时，丰田公司已经在失去市场份额，面临着在1950年以来第一次报出亏损的危险。当时日本经济疲软，与美国发生贸易摩擦，日圆坚挺也不利于出口，都很容易对丰田公司造成影响。
A series of non-Toyodas took the helm, beginning with Mr. Okuda in 1995 and ending with Mr. Watanabe in 2009. During their terms, the company revived financially and emerged as one of the most admired and studied companies in the world.
一系列外姓人掌权丰田公司，始于奥田硕1995年上任，终于渡边捷昭 2009年卸任。在他们的任期内，丰田公司实现了财务重振，并成为世界上最受景仰、受到最多研究的公司之一。
The gist of the Okuda-Watanabe strategy was to take Toyota's globalization efforts, launched under the previous generation of family management, to new levels. Even though the company had begun to build factories in the U.S. and other markets in the 1980s, it still was seen as largely insular and Japan-focused.
从奥田硕到渡边捷昭，他们的策略要点在于，要把前一代丰田家族管理层开创的国际化行动提升到一个新的水平。虽然丰田公司在上世纪80年代就已经开始在美国和其他市场建厂，但它仍被认为在很大程度上只是偏居日本一隅。
In 1996, Mr. Okuda and aides unveiled a new strategy dubbed the '2005 Vision.' They aimed to retool the auto maker over the coming decade, growing rapidly while relying less on exports and more on factories producing locally in target markets, from Argentina to Thailand to the U.S. Mr. Watanabe was one of the authors of the plan.
1996年，奥田硕团队公布了名为“2005愿景”(2005 Vision)的新战略。他们打算在后面的10年重新塑造丰田公司，使之快速增长，同时减少对出口的依赖，更加倚重于在阿根廷、泰国和美国等目标市场进行生产的工厂。渡边捷昭是这一计划的倡导者之一。
To realize this 10-year vision, the executives devised interim 'global master plans' to assign resources efficiently to different divisions, along with 'global profit management' plans that required sales executives around the world to attain certain profitability goals.
为实现这个10年愿景，管理团队推出了临时性的“全球大师计划”，目的是把资源有效地配置给不同的部门，另外还推出“全球利润管理”计划，要求全世界的销售经理人实现一定的盈利目标。
The 2005 Vision also pushed Toyota to implement kakushin, or revolutionary innovations, in vehicle design and manufacturing. That included efficiency drives to reduce costs, not only through conventional means, such as simplifying designs and using cheaper materials, but also by changing the way cars are engineered. For example, engineers were pushed to combine functions into fewer parts and systems. Their aim: cut the number of components in a car by half.
“2005愿景”还促使丰田公司在汽车设计和生产中实施“革新”(kakushin)。这包括提高效率、降低成本，其实现途径不仅仅是简化设计、降低材料成本等传统手段，还有改变汽车的建造方式。例如，工程师们被要求用更少的部件和系统来实现各种功能，目标是要把汽车的组件数量减半。
In 2002, the plan morphed into the '2010 Vision,' aiming for 15% global market share by the early 2010s, an ambitious jump from the 10% mark Toyota had at the time. Toyota has yet to achieve this goal. Its consolidated group market share rose to as high as about 13% in 2008, according to CSM Worldwide, a consulting firm that tracks auto makers.
2002年，“2005愿景”演进为“2010 愿景”，目标是到2010年代初期取得15%的全球市场份额。相比当时丰田公司10%的份额，这是一个很有野心的跳跃。目前丰田公司还没有实现这一目标。据跟踪汽车生产商的咨询公司CSM Worldwide称，2008年，丰田公司的集团综合市场份额达到了13%左右。
The effects of those measures were phenomenal. Starting around 2000, the company's global sales began growing by up to 600,000 vehicles a year, more than the annual overall volume achieved by Volvo.
上述措施效果明显。从2000年前后开始，该公司的全球销量以每年高达60万辆的速度增长，这个增长幅度比沃尔沃(Volvo)的全年总销量都还多。
During this 15-year non-family reign, Toyota achieved other milestones: operating profit margins zoomed to an industry-leading high of 8.6%. In 2008, Toyota displaced GM as the world's biggest auto maker by unit sales.
在外姓人掌权的这15年期间，丰田公司还取得了其他一些突破：营业利润率达到了行业领先水平8.6%。2008年，丰田取代通用汽车(GM)成为世界上销量最大的汽车生产商。
As part of his strategy, Mr. Okuda sought to diminish the family's role. According to executives close to him, Mr. Okuda said founding-family dominance was an outdated concept -- especially when the family controlled less than 2% of the stock in the publicly traded company.
奥田硕根据自己的战略，争取弱化丰田家族的作用。据接近他的经理人称，奥田硕认为创始家族占据主导地位是一种过时的概念，特别是在创始家族在这家上市公司当中持股不足2%的时候，更是如此。
At the peak of his power, Mr. Okuda publicly was frank about that belief. 'The Toyoda family will eventually become a 'shrine' to the company's foundation, to which we will pay respect once a year,' he told The Wall Street Journal in a 2000 interview.
在权力达到顶峰的时候，即使是在公开场合，奥田硕对这一观念也并不讳言。他在2000年接受《华尔街日报》采访时说，丰田家族最终将成为纪念公司创业时期的神龛，我们每年都会对着这个神龛敬上一次。
Asked then about future prospects for Mr. Toyoda, then a 43-year-old general manager, Mr. Okuda said: 'Nepotism just doesn't belong in our future.' He elaborated: 'Akio-class talents are rolling around all over Toyota, like so many potatoes.'
当时丰田章男43岁，担任的是一个总经理的职位。在那次采访中被问到丰田章男的前途时，奥田硕回答说，群带关系根本不属于我们的未来。他具体地说，像丰田章男这种水平的人才在丰田公司各个地方滚来滚去，就像是很多的土豆一样。
At the time, Mr. Toyoda seemed to have been sidelined. When he was assigned to lead Toyota's Chinese operations in 2001, China was still a backwater in Toyota's global strategy. Mr. Okuda, by then Toyota chairman, likened the job to 'mopping the floors' -- a safe place for grooming a scion with more ambition than experience, according to a separate Journal interview in 2003.
在当时，丰田章男似乎是坐着冷板凳。他于2001年被指派负责丰田的中国业务时，在公司的全球战略中，中国还是一片蛮荒之地。在《华尔街日报》2003年的另一次采访中，当时已是丰田董事长的奥田硕形容说，这份工作就像是“拖地板”，适合培育一棵野心大于经验的苗子。
But Mr. Toyoda fixed the troubled Chinese subsidiary and put it on a path for growth. He was then promoted in 2005 to the position of executive vice president, where he had broad responsibilities, including quality, product management, purchasing and global sales.
但丰田章男修复了困难重重的中国子公司，将它推上了增长轨道。2005年，他晋升为执行副总裁，拥有广泛的职责，包括质量、产品管理、采购和全球销售。
Even as he climbed the ladder, Mr. Toyoda said little in top management meetings, according to some nonfamily executives. As Toyota made progress, the non-family executives began dismissing Mr. Toyoda and treated him as a not-so-bright spoiled rich kid, say several non-family managers.
据一些外姓经理人说，即使是在丰田章男往上爬的时候，他在高层会议上也是少言寡语。几位外姓经理人说，随着丰田公司取得进步，外姓经理人们开始不重视丰田章男，把他看做是一位智商不那么高的富家子。
Executives close to Mr. Toyoda dispute the notion that he was overpowered by top management. While the company's financial reports were improving, a number of vehicle recalls signalled that its famed quality was slipping, and Mr. Toyoda began to sound the warning bell. On Dec. 2, 2005, the end of the year when Mr. Okuda's 10-year vision was coming to fruition, Mr. Toyoda gave an unpublicized, internal speech questioning the new direction.
与丰田章男关系密切的高管驳斥了认为他被高管层压制的看法。虽然丰田公司的财报有所好转，但多起车辆召回事件表明丰田的高质量声誉正在下滑，丰田章男也开始敲响警钟。2005年12月5日，在奥田硕10年愿景即将实现的那一年年末，丰田章男发表了不公开的内部讲话，对这个新的方向提出质疑。
Talking to engineers and mid-level executives, Mr. Toyoda said the rapid expansion exceeded the company's ability to assure the quality and reliability of each model. He called on the engineers, seated inside an auditorium at Toyota's global headquarters, to shift their mindset and attain the 'resolve to make a big turn from emphasizing volume to quality,' according to a summary of the speech reviewed by the Journal.
丰田章男对公司的工程师和中层管理人员说，这种迅速扩张超越了公司确保每款汽车质量和可靠性的能力。《华尔街日报》所见的讲话概要显示，在丰田全球总部礼堂内，他要求在坐的工程师们转变思想，实现从注重产量到注重质量的重大转变。
Top executives at the time say Mr. Toyoda never took such complaints directly to them.
当时的丰田公司高管说，丰田章男从未直接向他们提出这类意见。
In 2008, the question of family vs. nonfamily management came to a head as Mr. Watanabe was preparing to retire as chief executive. Mr. Okuda, then a board member, angled for a close aide, another nonfamily executive, to take the job. Shoichiro Toyoda, a former president who remained an influential adviser, weighed in for Akio, his son, according to senior Toyota executives.
2008 年渡边捷昭准备从首席执行长的位置上退休时，家族管理还是非家族管理的问题浮出了水面。当时任董事会成员的奥田硕试图让与他关系密切的一名副手接任，此人也非丰田家族成员。丰田高管说，曾任丰田总裁、当时仍担任颇有影响力的公司顾问的丰田章一郎(Shoichiro Toyoda)则支持其子丰田章男。
In January 2009, the company announced Akio Toyoda would replace Mr. Watanabe as president in June. Taking charge at 53 years old, Mr. Toyoda became Toyota's youngest chief executive since his grandfather became president in 1941 at age 47.
2009 年1月，丰田公司宣布丰田章男将于当年6月接替渡边捷昭任首席执行长一职。53岁上任的丰田章男成为继他的祖父之后最年轻的首席执行长。他的祖父于 1941年47岁时当上总裁。
The younger Mr. Toyoda declared as one of his first priorities undoing many of his predecessor's policies. He began by signaling to underlings that he didn't share Mr. Watanabe's informal goal of hitting two trillion yen or more in annual operating income. He immediately killed the 'global profit management' plan, associates say.
丰田章男宣布他的首要任务之一就是取消前任的诸多政策。他开始是向手下暗示，他并不苟同渡边捷昭定下的年度营运收入达到两万亿日圆或以上的非正式目标。他的助手说，他立即否定了“全球利润管理”计划。
The reality of Toyota's quality problems -- the main battleground inside the company today -- is a bit ambiguous.
丰田质量问题的真实情况有些暧昧不明，这正是丰田公司内部当前的主要矛盾所在。
Two separate surveys conducted by J.D. Power & Associates show the Toyota brand quality has actually improved over the past decade, measured by a decline in the rate of owner complaints. This occurred even as the number of vehicles the company recalled around the world skyrocketed in that time.
消费研究机构J.D. Power & Associates分别进行的两项调查显示，从车主投诉率下降来看，过去十年间丰田品牌质量实际上有所提升。这种情况也刚好是丰田公司在全球召回汽车的数量不断飙升之际。
The surveys also show that Toyota rivals improved faster. In 2000, Toyota's luxury brand Lexus placed first in quality rankings for used-car owners, while the Toyota brand ranked fourth. By 2009, Lexus fell from the top spot, ranking behind Buick and Jaguar, while the Toyota brand again placed fourth. In quality rankings for new-car owners, the Toyota brand in 2000 tied with BMW for fourth. In 2009, Toyota ranked sixth.
调查还显示，丰田的竞争对手提高更快。2000年，丰田的豪华车品牌雷克萨斯(Lexus)在二手车主的质量评级中排名第一，丰田品牌则排名第四。2009年，雷克萨斯的冠军位置不保，排在了别克(Buick)和捷豹(Jaguar)之后，丰田品牌再度排在第四位。在新车车主的质量评级中，丰田品牌2000年与宝马(BMW)并列第四，2009年丰田排第六。
Mr. Toyoda's supporters blame the slippage in relative quality rankings -- as well as the sharp rise in recalls -- on the company's previous non-family managers. It takes two to three years to develop a new car, so the models experiencing problems were developed before Akio Toyoda took the helm last June.
丰田章男的支持者将相关的质量排名下滑以及召回数量大幅增加归咎于公司此前非丰田家族的管理者。开发一款新车需要两到三年时间，因此出现问题的车型是在丰田章男去年6月执掌大权之前开发的。
The nonfamily executives acknowledge they made some mistakes. One says a large number of inexperienced contract engineers hired from outside agencies -- an effort to save money as they tried to boost engineering capacity -- led to at least some of the increase in quality glitches.
以前的管理者们承认他们犯了一些错误。其中一位说，质量问题增多至少有一部分原因是从外面的中介招聘大量没有经验的合同工程师，这一举措是为了在提升工程产能的同时节省成本。
But the non-family managers blame Mr. Toyoda's management style -- both external and internal -- as much as anything for letting the defects turn from a fixable problem into a full crisis.
但那些管理者也同样指责丰田章男对内对外的管理风格，认为其导致了故障从可修复的问题发展成全面的危机。
Mr. Toyoda's in-house detractors say the president has created an informal team of loyalists, making it tough for managers trying to communicate through the formal channels. One nonfamily manager says the current executive structure operates like a 'shadow management team,' doubling up information and management.
丰田公司内部对丰田章男有意见的人士说，他创立了一个非正式的效忠者团队，令管理人员很难通过正式渠道沟通。一位非丰田家族的管理人员说，当前的管理架构就像“影子管理团队”，令信息沟通和管理变得重复。
In terms of handling the American public, politicians and press, they say Mr. Toyoda was slow to address publicly the controversy. And when he did finally speak out, they say, his statements were widely criticized as vague and halting.
在应对美国公众、政治家和媒体方面，他们认为丰田章男对争议作出公开反应太过迟缓。而当他最终公开发表意见时，他的讲话被普遍批为模糊空洞。
Mr. Toyoda's supporters say, on the contrary, he's been clear and direct about the direction he wants to follow. At a press conference last month, Mr. Toyoda said the previous expansion push may have caused it to scrimp on quality, compromising its just-in-time production system, for example. 'I would like to make sure we re-embrace those basics and rebuild the foundation of Toyota and its production system,' he said.
相反，丰田章男的支持者认为，他清楚自己想要前进的方向并直截了当。在上个月的一个新闻发布会上，丰田章男说，此前的扩张举措或许导致丰田牺牲了质量，危及其高效的生产体系。丰田章男说，我想确保我们重新接受那些基本的原则，重建丰田以及其产品体系。
Norihiko Shirouzu
http://cn.wsj.com/gb/20100414/ffe121857.asp
